Wells Fargo Scandal: How Bad Management and Sales Quotas Drove Gaming the Numbers

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tl;dr: Wells Fargo didn't have a “bad apples” problem–it had a bad management system. Unrealistic sales quotas and fear-driven incentives made gaming the numbers easier than doing the right thing.

The Wells Fargo scandal is a textbook example of how bad management systems, fear-based leadership, and arbitrary sales quotas can drive widespread gaming of the numbers–without requiring bad people.

What Actually Happened in the Wells Fargo Scandal

In a nutshell, thousands of Wells Fargo employees across the nation fraudulently opened unwanted bank accounts or credit card accounts for customers. Two million accounts. This probably hurt the credit scores of customers and they were hit with $2.5 million in fees for the unwanted accounts.

Fear-Based Sales Targets and Arbitrary Quotas

Why would these employees do that?

They were under a lot of pressure from bank managers and executives to hit arbitrary goals… eight financial products per customer.

Why eight? The CEO, John G. Stumpf, said (I kid you not), “It rhymes with great.” Employees are lucky, perhaps, that he doesn't know that nine rhymes with “fine?” Or that eleven rhymes with “heaven?”

What Deming Would Say About Arbitrary Targets

Eight sounds like the perfect definition of an arbitrary goal, as Dr. Deming would say. Deming would ask, “By what method” would you accomplish such a goal? There apparently wasn't a method (at least a good one) provided by management.

This article summarizes and has other links:

Reports by the Los Angeles Times and the L.A. city attorney have made it clear that there has long been a culture of fear, born of threats to workers' livelihoods and impossible sales goals, at Wells Fargo.

Multiple employees have complained of a company culture that encouraged fraud by setting impossible goals in “crossing-selling” — ie. selling multiple accounts to the same customer — and then offering big bonuses to employees who hit them. Tuesday's hearing clarified that Wells Fargo's sales goal was eight accounts per customer, while most banks average only three.

When employees couldn't hit that arbitrary target organically, they realized they could cheat the system. You can't blame them for wanting to save their jobs. They were only being paid about $12 an hour. They weren't financial wizards or criminal masterminds. There was no grand conspiracy cooked up by the CEO or other executives… but they should have anticipated how this could go awry.

Senator Elizabeth Warren said:

“You squeezed your employees to the breaking point so they would cheat customers and you could drive up your stock,”

I heard some analysis yesterday that if Wells Fargo did conspire to commit this fraud, it was really dumb because opening and closing fake accounts added cost and didn't really add any revenue. The higher “accounts per customer” number gave the CEO something to brag about on earnings calls with Wall Street, which might have boosted the stock price… something that benefited CEO Stumpf more than the employees.

Accountability, Blame, and the Myth of “Bad Apples”

Wells Fargo says it has fired 5,300 front-line staff and managers over the past five years. There's been a lot of blaming going on… the CEO blaming all of these employees for not living up to Wells Fargo's alleged ethics and values (read their online statement to see how far off from reality this is).

The bank has been fined $185 million for the shenanigans.

Yet Carrie Tolstedt, the Wells Fargo executive responsible for the 6,000 branches during this time, received a $126 million retirement package, even though these bank practices were under investigation for a while. So much for accountability.

5300 “bad apples” certainly sounds like a system problem to me… and that's leadership's responsibility.

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Here are a few links to articles I've read:

Those links should give you a good sense of the situation… and how this could have been anticipated and avoided through better management.

As we've learned in other situations, when it's easier to game the numbers or to distort the system than it is to actually improve the system, bad things will happen.

I learned this from Dr. Deming's work and from Brian Joiner wrote in his outstanding book  Fourth Generation Management: The New Business Consciousness.

Three Predictable Responses to Targets

As Joiner wrote, there are three things that can happen when you have a quota or a target:

  1. Distort the system
  2. Distort the numbers
  3. Improve the system

What Leaders Should Learn from the Wells Fargo Scandal

What's the lesson for managers in any setting?

When you set an unrealistic quota… and then pressure people to hit the quota (through threats or promises of rewards)… you need to anticipate how people might game the numbers or distort the system.

Why This Matters in 2026: Quotas Haven't Gone Away–They've Just Been Rebranded

In 2026, many leaders like to believe we've moved past crude quotas and fear-based management. In reality, quotas haven't disappeared–they've been renamed.

Today they show up as OKRs, stretch targets, dashboards, scorecards, rankings, star ratings, productivity benchmarks, AI-generated performance alerts, and incentive plans tied to a single number. Whether in government or business, the pattern is the same: senior leaders set ambitious targets, expect improvement, and assume the system will somehow comply.

But the underlying risk hasn't changed.

When leaders set targets without improving the system, people are still forced into an impossible choice:

  • Miss the number and suffer consequences, or
  • Make the numbers look good–by distorting data, redefining terms, shifting work off the books, or quietly cutting corners.

In government, this shows up in manipulated wait times, compliance metrics, clearance rates, inspection counts, or case backlogs that “magically” improve on paper. In business, it appears as inflated sales figures, premature revenue recognition, artificial productivity gains, or customer experience scores that don't match reality.

What's different in 2026 is speed and scale. Data moves faster. Dashboards update in real time. Algorithms flag “underperformance” instantly. The pressure to explain variance–or eliminate it–arrives sooner and hits harder. That makes gaming the system not only predictable, but often rational.

The lesson hasn't changed since Deming:

Targets don't improve systems. Management does.

If leaders want real improvement–shorter waits, better quality, safer outcomes, healthier finances–they must design systems that make honesty safer than deception, learning safer than blame, and improvement easier than gaming.

Otherwise, we'll keep reliving the same scandals with newer tools, flashier dashboards, and the same disappointing results.

More Examples of Gaming the Numbers Across Industries

Wells Fargo is not unique. When leaders rely on fear, arbitrary targets, and incentives without improving the system, gaming the numbers becomes predictable. Here are additional examples–across industries–where bad metrics and bad management produced bad behavior.

https://www.leanblog.org/2007/02/gm-got-gamed-how-fudge-production-numbers
https://www.leanblog.org/2014/05/the-real-va-scandal-is-the-long-waiting-times-bad-management-not-gaming-by-bad-apples
https://www.leanblog.org/2008/07/gaming-system-er-targets
https://www.leanblog.org/2012/01/a-vivid-example-of-gaming-the-numbers-on-the-office


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If you’re working to build a culture where people feel safe to speak up, solve problems, and improve every day, I’d be glad to help. Let’s talk about how to strengthen Psychological Safety and Continuous Improvement in your organization.

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Mark Graban
Mark Graban is an internationally-recognized consultant, author, and professional speaker, and podcaster with experience in healthcare, manufacturing, and startups. Mark's latest book is The Mistakes That Make Us: Cultivating a Culture of Learning and Innovation, a recipient of the Shingo Publication Award. He is also the author of Measures of Success: React Less, Lead Better, Improve More, Lean Hospitals and Healthcare Kaizen, and the anthology Practicing Lean, previous Shingo recipients. Mark is also a Senior Advisor to the technology company KaiNexus.

9 COMMENTS

  1. Comment via LinkedIn:

    Trevor Waldo: I agree with your perspective Mark. The system is the underlying root cause, not the employees working within the system. It’s not about “metrics” either… Just because something is measured does not dictate gaming / cheating / manipulation will occur. The key is how the system reacts to the metrics, the degree to which the employees are incentivized to meet or penalized to miss. The Freakonomics book series and podcasts explore many facets of incentive impacts – absolutely fascinating!! They truly explain why so many things are “the way they are.”

    My response:

    Right… metrics + lack of a method + undue pressure = gaming and cheating

  2. More from LinkedIn:

    Barry Alexander:

    My experience indicates that management sets unrealistic goals yet insists on meeting them. This creates conflict between ethics, results, and keeping your job. Bad things result yet management seems to never learn. Perhaps jail instead of fines would work better.

    Michael Bremer:

    I’m not big on blame, although I’ll admit it is sometimes (very rarely) appropriate. Mostly people work within the constraints of the process. This includes the specific rules/procedures for doing the task. And the management support systems (policies/procedures) that guide the way work gets done. The latter includes metrics. Most people do not promote doing something blatantly unethical, a few do. Generally it’s the processes. And when organizations are not in touch with the actual reality of their processes, sometimes goofy things happen.

    My reply:

    I think “avoiding blame” (my thought) is not the same as never holding anybody accountable. Have you studied the “Just Culture” approach from healthcare, Michael? There is a time to hold an individual accountable if they made a bad choice that they knew would cause harm. One test is “Would another person in that same situation make the same mistake?” At Wells, that certainly seems to be the case, times 5300

    S. Max Brown:

    When people are driven to get results by any means possible, the unstated values and behavior prevails. When behavior isn’t what we want, it is the leaders responsibility to consider the system that is promoting that behavior (including the metrics and unstated values). Accountability for the systems that drive the behavior — that is leadership’s role.

    There is no mea culpa when you promote the system and metrics that produce the behavior and outcome. Those employees who did refuse or even called the ethics line, were often fired soon afterwards. The culture of fear and survival (to pay the bills and keep a seemingly attractive work resume) keeps many from jumping.

    What are the rewards for executives to behave this way? For years, they made MILLIONS under this system — it worked for their own pocketbooks and so it was promoted. Today, over 5000 lose their jobs and senior executives get hundreds of millions in incentives.

    Petri Huitti:

    I dont know what are the proofs etc. but I feel management was more consciously driving the fraud from up to down than comes out from your article. When managing with fear, people may do funny things, they even support war, destroyment of distant countries claimed to be threat. When warriors, workers, leaders, one by one, start taking their inner force into use, not obeying the fear pushing from outside, they start to make the right thing, what they feel right, in their hearts. Then wars, misusing people, nature, communities will stop. Peace will come into the world, piece by piece. This is revolution, revolution of love we can all participate. And the world will look quite different after that, after few years.

  3. Upate:

    Wells Fargo Fires Four Executives Following Probe of Sales-Practices Scandal
    Terminated executives won’t receive 2016 bonus and will forfeit unvested equity, bank says

    (via WSJ)

    “Within Wells Fargo, employees expressed satisfaction that the bank appeared to now be calling higher-level staff to task. “No one who was directly managing this has been held accountable except for lower-level team members,” said a current retail-banking executive.”

  4. Wells Fargo is now running ads asking people for a second chance.

    The ad says they’ve ended “sales goals for branch managers.”

    I’m glad they’re focused , it seems, on the system instead of running ads saying they have fired all of the bad people.

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