Episode #85 is a conversation with David Meier, a former Toyota Georgetown Group Leader and the co-author of the books The Toyota Way Fieldbook and Toyota Talent: Developing Your People the Toyota Way.
With Toyota facing widespread attention during the 2010 recall crisis, David offers an insider's perspective on the company's values, decision-making, and commitment to quality and safety. He explains why Toyota's bias for facts and genchi genbutsu (go and see) makes it difficult to act on incomplete or unclear information, and why the company's response to customer and regulatory concerns was more complex than media narratives suggested.
The discussion highlights the difference between speculation and problem-solving, the role of confirmation bias in shaping public perception, and Toyota's enduring principle of “stop and fix” when abnormalities arise. David also reflects on the company's culture of prioritizing safety and quality over growth, while acknowledging the challenges rapid expansion may have created. Listeners will gain valuable lessons about leadership under pressure, fact-based decision-making, and how Lean thinking can guide organizations through crises without losing sight of their values
David was a guest on episodes #17 and #35 of the podcast if you want to check those out.
For earlier episodes, visit the main Podcast page, which includes information on how to subscribe via RSS or via Apple Podcasts.
Transcript
Mark Graban: Hi, this is Mark Graban from the Lean Blog. This is episode number 85 of the Lean Blog podcast for March 15, 2010. Our guest today is David Meier, formerly of the Toyota Georgetown plant in Kentucky and the co-author of the books The Toyota Way Field Book and Toyota Talent. So we're going to be talking today about David's thoughts on some of the current situation with Toyota, the problems and the reaction to those problems by the general public and the media, and maybe frame some different ways of asking questions and looking at a scenario like this. Well, I'm very happy to welcome back a returning guest and a good friend of the Lean Blog podcast, David Meier.
Mark Graban: Thanks for being here.
David Meier: Thank you, Mark. Good to be here again.
Mark Graban: Well, it's been a while since we've talked on the podcast here, so I was wondering if you could give kind of a quick background of your experiences with Toyota and what you're doing today.
David Meier: Okay, sure. I was fortunate to start with the Georgetown, Kentucky plant in 1987 early on and go through the entire process there of starting up that facility and working with Toyota, and then since 1997 have been working with other organizations in their efforts to become Lean both in the US and internationally now.
Mark Graban: And so even though you're not there on the inside with Toyota directly anymore, I think you've got an interesting perspective. I'm curious to hear and for the listeners, just generally what your thoughts and perspectives are on the recent problems that Toyota has had. What kind of questions that you think people should be asking. What might be a good, useful way of looking at this situation. What are your thoughts here?
David Meier: Sure, yeah. Well, the first thing I have to say is that in terms of problem-solving, and clearly Toyota has a problem right now, not really clear what the causes of the problem are, but we can surely say that there is a problem that, you know, all of us are prone to bias, and that's one of the hindrances of good problem-solving is really working through bias and working on facts. And so I try very hard in this case to set aside my own personal bias about Toyota. From my experience, certainly as a former insider, I understand at least up and through 1997, that safety and quality were always very, very important issues. And I think that would still be true today.
David Meier: In comparison to other companies I've seen since then, we spent an inordinate amount of time and effort to produce high quality and safe products. So that's just my opinion as an insider. And I think the values of the company, clearly that Toyota has demonstrated their willingness to follow their values, stop and fix once they find a problem. So they shut down the assembly plants, customer first, and so on. I think that it's easy for folks on the outside to sort of speculate and to look for the kind of, the smoking gun in the situation and the reality of the facts of the situation are quite different.
David Meier: I think, you know, from my experience on the inside. One of the challenges is that information coming from customers through, for example, dealers or through the NHTSA, through those organizations, that the information tends to get, I don't know, either damaged in some way. It's not always accurate. It's unclear. It gets classified in strange ways.
David Meier: I mean, we would get parts back that clearly had been in some kind of auto accident and they would state that it was a factory defect kind of thing. And so I can imagine it's really difficult for Toyota at this time to sort through the issues and try to understand the actual facts.
Mark Graban: It seems like there's got to be a lot of complexity involved. Like you said, they shut the factory down. People have referred to that as sort of a corporate equivalent of pulling the andon cord, if you will.
David Meier: But it seems like there's got to be a balance between how quickly do you react based on a first report of something, or there's some who are saying that, yeah, they shut down the factories. There are some who are critical that maybe they didn't act quickly enough.
David Meier: Yeah, I think that's the only question that could be debated and that's where I don't have facts. I think from what I've seen and read and what I know is that again, the information sometimes as it comes through is sketchy. And if Toyota has a downside, one of them would be that they like to work with facts. You know, the Genchi Genbutsu says, go and see for yourself, gather facts. And in light of that, if you look at the numbers and you say, well, there's maybe now, maybe now, there's a couple of hundred instances reported out of X million vehicles.
David Meier: And to actually go into the field and find facts and duplicate the situation that occurred is extremely challenging. And to pull the andon cord at Toyota, what we need is we need a reference standard to say that there's an abnormality. And when you discover an abnormality, then you pull the cord. So that's Toyota's value, says, when you find a problem, stop and fix the problem. And so the question is, when does it become a problem?
David Meier: At what point do you recognize that and acknowledge that and then do that?
Mark Graban: So one thing maybe we can go back and touch on again. You said a couple of minutes ago that especially when you worked on the factory floor, that there was such a high focus on quality and safety compared to other companies that you've seen. And it seems in this whole Toyota situation, I haven't heard accusations that these are manufacturing defects. It seems that there are product design issues, that there may be some customer response issues. But that piece in the middle, the factory seems to have been free of allegations of problems.
Mark Graban: But can you elaborate a little bit more there in the factory, how that safety and quality focus translated into management priorities or daily activities from your experience?
David Meier: Well, I think that the first thing to say is that in terms of the daily priorities and choices, safety and quality were never sacrificed for any other gains. In other words, we wouldn't do Kaizen and then have a reduction of the quality. So that would just go against the grain of Kaizen. The issue is that out in the field where these things are happening, people are saying, well, Toyota grew too fast, they put an emphasis on growth and that has created these problems. They're four basic categories.
David Meier: Either the those three categories, sticky accelerators, one is floor mats and the other is this nylon swelling issue, perhaps. And then there's a steering thing that's still unclear. And then there's the Prius brake issue.
Mark Graban: There's some software issues.
David Meier: Potentially, yeah, as a causal factor. Potentially software. So still unclear whether that's the case or not. For me, I don't know. I don't have the facts again.
David Meier: So to me, one would have to make the logical assumption that if growth, if excessive growth were a causal factor, we would see more widespread quality issues. In other words, there would be issues in workmanship, fit and finish, and squeaks and rattles, you know, a lot of those things that would be related to, you know, taking on too much too quickly. Now, at the same time, I could say that there is a possible correlation between growth and the, you know, reduction in time to design new vehicles and the ability to support that process. In other words, is it possible that there's a linkage there? And I would have to say, yes, it's possible.
David Meier: Is it the fact? I don't know. Is it a contributing factor? I would say, yes, it's definitely a possibility. You know, again, the issues, one could say with the steering issue on the Corollas, for instance, there's a lot of factors that affect steering.
David Meier: Tire pressure, alignment. You know, those factors all affect steering.
Mark Graban: Right.
David Meier: So to say it's the steering mechanism, again, one would have to get the steering mechanism, kind of take it apart and try to find out what the actual cause is.
Mark Graban: So maybe we delve a little bit more into. You talk about facts versus possibilities and the comments by Toyota's CEO, Mr. Toyoda, his testimony to Congress, where it was reported that, well, Toyota's CEO admits that the focus had become growth instead of the traditional focus on safety and quality. I know you have some thoughts on the way that was reported.
David Meier: Right, right. And again, this is just my opinion here. I haven't talked to Mr. Toyoda, but I think that when, if I could use the analogy, when the enemy's circled around you, you sort of have to come up with a method to placate. And I think that's what I heard in there was he said, his quote was, “I fear that we may have,” meaning it's not a fact, that it's a possibility, and that he's acknowledging that possibility at the same time not declaring it to be a fact. And I think that my opinion was when the congressional hearings were, they were definitely looking to find the faulty, guilty party, and that he just…
David Meier: …that that was a simple way to sort of acknowledge that and to say, yes, perhaps we have lost sight of some of the things that we hold value. Again, I don't think it's an absolute fact.
Mark Graban: Well, it's interesting that I think I missed the subtlety there of you're saying, if Mr. Toyoda was talking about, well, it could be and it might have been. The media seemed to report it as fact. And maybe that's because the comments support the narrative that they were looking to put in place. And I think we're all to some extent a victim of what you might call confirmation bias, of looking for things that support what you believe. I'm a huge fan of the Lean methodology.
Mark Graban: So do I tend to look for and talk about things that support the fact that Lean works? Well, of course. But I think we all take care to make sure that confirmation bias doesn't become a blind spot.
David Meier: Right? Yeah, actually that's what I was just thinking. I refer to it as expectation bias, but essentially the same thing in that we're looking and expecting for him to acknowledge that. And certainly one could say, oh yes, he did. But he said again to read the exact words.
David Meier: He said, “I fear we may have lost sight, that growth may have caused us to lose sight of.” And so when you look at that, “I fear,” he didn't say, “I know,” he didn't say “we did.” Those would be more statements of fact. And so yes, everybody wanted to hear, “Oh yes, Mr. Toyoda agreed that they put growth in front of safety,” but that's not what he said at all.
Mark Graban: Well, there's a perception, and here's a first on the podcast, I actually had gone out to Twitter and mentioned that I was going to be interviewing you and did anyone have any questions? So this is the first time I've had a question pop up.
David Meier: Okay, cool.
Mark Graban: Basically during an interview. It comes from AOL Autos. I think you've addressed some of this. But here's the question and the perception out there. It says, “When does David think the tipping point occurred? Was there a time when Toyota went from, quote, ‘quality' to ‘quantity'?”
Mark Graban: So I think you've already touched on that, but if you could maybe address that question.
David Meier: Well, I think that one of the things I just read some information from my co-author, Jeff Liker, this morning and you know, we'd have to go way back, way back to when I joined Toyota in 1987. In the very beginning they told us, look, the plan here is for you guys in America to be self-sufficient. This is going to be an American plant run by Americans. They told us at that time that there would never be more than 2% Japanese management involved in the daily operations. And I think actually the fact is it's less than 2% at this time.
David Meier: I think that when they came out with their vision for 2010 and they stated 15% market share as kind of a goal, there was a behind-the-scenes understanding that it was intended to drive the self-sufficiency of the Americans in the US running the Toyota operations to become self-sufficient and Toyota to do things. And so they've, you know, years ago, as far as a decade ago or more, Toyota understood that the constraint to growth, as always, is the development of people. And you know, has been working on and implementing strategies for further development of people. So for example, all the executive leadership in the United States has gone back through and been required to do what they're calling Toyota Business Practice, which is basically problem-solving. And they all have to do an A3 on a particular problem and take it in front of a panel.
David Meier: And a fair percentage of the guys who are executives fail the panel first go-round and have to go back and work at it some more. And so again, one could argue the point, say, well, Toyota put growth in front of quality or something and there was a tipping point. And I would say no. What I recall back in the early 90s when we would have our town hall meetings and review information and so forth, there was never a comment about growth. We never talked about becoming number one.
David Meier: But we would always look at a graph, a chart that showed Toyota sales, Ford, GM, Chrysler, and you know, anybody that looked at the graph could see the trajectories and pretty well predict when Toyota was going to cross Ford and Chrysler and GM. Right. I mean it, we didn't put it up there and say, hey look, our goal is to be better than GM. They put it up and they'd say if we continue on this path, here's what's likely to happen.
Mark Graban: That sounds different than the portrayal of “it became number one or bust.”
David Meier: Yeah, I think that portrayal is skewed. I don't think that from my experience, I don't think that Toyota ever put out a mission anywhere that said we have to become number one. I think they understood that it was inevitable. I think from what I've seen, and you read interviews with Watanabe or some of the former chairman, they would always talk about their fear of what would happen if they became number one. You know, the big company disease, the complacency, the arrogance.
David Meier: So they do understand that dynamic, that along with success comes a tendency for complacency and perhaps arrogance and then perhaps some of the situations like they're encountering right now. Now again, from a problem-solving standpoint, looking at it in terms of cause and effect versus decision and action. So in other words, does one lead to another? Does one understand that success can lead to complacency and that can lead to problems? Yes.
David Meier: Was it an active decision from Toyota's standpoint to say, you know, forget everything else, we will be number one? I would say no. So, you know, again, that's the danger of a bias or an assumption is one might look at it and say, well, the outcome is that Toyota has a problem, therefore it must have been this causal factor, you see. And the fact is that's not the case. The causal factors, as you indicated earlier, could be a failure in the factory where the products were made.
David Meier: It could be a failure of the driver. It could be… who knows whether these cars were taken to some shade-tree mechanic and parts were modified. The famous Lexus with the accident apparently had some aftermarket mats installed where people are doing other things. I know my wife likes to drive her car and she's sometimes got clutter on the floor and I tell her, you've got to get that out of there.
David Meier: Who knows? The point is there's so many possible factors that to try to identify one and say, oh, yes, growth is what it was, I think is shortsighted.
Mark Graban: Well, I want to thank you, David, again, our guest, David Meier, author of some outstanding books including, The Toyota Way Field Book and Toyota Talent. If you can remind the listeners, your website, if they want to be able to find you online.
David Meier: Sure, it's just leanassociates.com. Just look for those books on Google and you'll find it.
Mark Graban: Is there a new project, a new one in the works by chance?
David Meier: Actually, there was. I've kind of taken a little bit of a hiatus on that for some personal reasons and so forth, and also the struggle with… really, I'm just kind of coming to the point where I'm really trying to understand some of the more subtle things that Toyota does. And I'm just taking some time, more time, I think, to reflect on those and perhaps have a better understanding of those before I put it in writing. So, always thinking on this process and thinking about how we can improve the success rate of organizations and really help with the progress of Lean in general.
Mark Graban: Okay, well, good luck with the project and we'll stay tuned for that. I want to thank you again for taking time out to share your thoughts and opinions here on the podcast.
David Meier: Sure. Always glad to help.
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 examines Toyota’s 2010 quality challenges—separating facts from bias, discussing genchi genbutsu, and what true Lean problem-solving looks like amid recalls and media narratives.){kind=link}
More self preservation interviews. Geez do you guys ever do real interviews instead of prescripted? Unbelievable! You guys are truly EXPERTS in the self described fiction. Do you guys need some work? I am going to start selling latex bracelets with WWMD molded in after listening to this rubbish. Could stand for What Would Mark/Meier Do. I hope the Smithsonian is paying attention to your staged interviews. Manufacturing folks may not see this but the hospitals will see right through this cookie cutter interview. Shame on you Mark and Dave for doing yoru coffee table skit under the guise of some formal interview. Definitely going to show this to the team when there is a few minutes availbale for recreation…Unbelievable new low in lean.
Jon – I don’t understand what your problem is. My podcast is just two guys talking. It’s not scripted, it’s not fake. Why don’t you judge based on the content of what David says, or did you not listen?
Would you like to be interviewed? I’ll gladly offer that to you.
What in the world does the Smithsonian have to do with anything?
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